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REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN LIGHT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
Conor Gearty*
I. INTRODUCTION
It seems at times as though the entire world has become ad-
dicted to human rights. The United States has, of course, had its
famed Bill of Rights' for generations. The United Kingdom's Hu-
man Rights Act has recently come into force.' That measure also
applies to Northern Ireland,3 with human rights issues appearing
in the Good Friday Agreement.4 Both Britain and Ireland have
adopted the model of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,5 a charter agreed to on November 4,
* Professor of Human Rights Law, King's College London. My thanks are due to the
Leverhulme Trust for an award that has given me a much fuller opportunity than I would
otherwise have had to conduct the research upon which this article is based, and to secure
the time to be able to write up my conclusions. My thanks also go to Dean John R. Pagan
and the members of the University of Richmond School of Law for having extended such a
warm welcome to my family and me during our visit to the school in Spring 2000, and for
having provided me with such a delightful, scholarly environment in which to work.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
2. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (U.K.) (enacted Oct. 2, 2000).
3. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47 (U.K.).
4. Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, U.K-N. Ir.-Ir., 37
I.L.M. 751.
5. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
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1950, by western European nations emerging from a dark age of
fascist totalitarianism. The body which gave birth to that charter,
the Council of Europe, used to be comprised of a small group of
nations broadly allied to the west in the great Cold War argu-
ment.6 Now, having re-energized itself after 1989, the organiza-
tion boasts no fewer than forty-one member states, drawn from as
far afield as Turkey, Macedonia, Moldova, and Iceland.' Each of
these countries has also incorporated the European Convention
on Human Rights into their domestic law in some shape or form.'
Most of them also have their own constitutional rights system,
sometimes based upon the United States model.9 The European
Union has recently joined the "rights party," with its own Charter
of Rights, agreed to at the end of 2000, albeit in the teeth of
strong opposition from some parts of the business sector.'0 There
is of course already in place a plethora of other rights instru-
ments" and a plan for an international criminal court. 2 Clear
evidence can be found that western judges are taking more seri-
ously than ever their enforcement responsibilities with respect to
these various legal mandates.'
Despite all this extraordinary activity, the idea of human
rights remains as elusive as ever. 4 It is tempting to refuse to ac-
cord any clear meaning to the phrase and then to deploy it politi-
6. For a good general background to the Convention, see FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES
FOR A GODLESS AGE: THE STORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS (2000).
7. Directorate General of Human Rights, Human Rights Information Bulletin No. 47
(Council of Europe, 2000).
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, su-
pra note 5, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224 ("The High Contracting Parties shall secure to eve-
ryone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Conven-
tion.").
9. For a limited comparative survey, see EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (C.A. Gearty ed.,
1997) [hereinafter EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES].
10. Martin Fletcher, CBI Leads Attack on EU Charters Right to Strike, TIMES (Lon-
don), Sept. 21, 2000, at 17. The CBI is Britain's foremost organization for employers.
11. For a comprehensive list, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: DOCUMENTS AND
INTRODUCTORY NOTES (Felix Ermacora et al. eds., 1993).
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999;
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSULTATION
AND DRAFT LEGISLATION (2000) (on file with author).
13. See, e.g., R. v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate exparte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 2), [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Eng.). See generally HUGH
O'SHAUGHNESSY, PINOCHET: THE POLITICS OF TORTURE (2000).
14. See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES
(1998).
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cally as a tool to achieve one's own moral ends by trumping the
arguments of others with one's own conclusive, moral interven-
tions. 5 The risk with this approach to human rights is two-fold.
First, there is the risk that the term will become useless through
overuse. (How can you play the game of politics when all the
cards are trumps?) Second, there is the risk that the powerful in
society will use the phrase as an ally in their constant battle with
the disadvantaged majority to keep a disproportionate share of
their community's resources. If we care at all about equality and
justice, this last eventuality should particularly disturb us. A way
to counter it would be to fashion a strong meaning for the idea of
human rights that locates the phrase firmly on the side of the
poor and the disadvantaged. 6 But this takes us back full circle to
the fact that the intellectual coherence of the term is, to put it
mildly, not obvious.
II. THE LEGACY OF BENTHAM AND MARX
The shallowness of the concept of human rights has been
known for over two hundred years, a fact that makes all the more
curious the huge resurgence of rights talk in recent decades. The
idea was first paraded through the streets of post-Enlightenment
Europe in the course of the French Revolution with the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen ("the Declaration"). 7
Though perhaps more rhetorical than philosophical in intent, it
was as the latter that the great nineteenth-century thinker Jer-
emy Bentham tore it apart in his justly celebrated Anarchical
Fallacies.'" In this age of glib generalities, it is worth recalling
what Bentham had to say about the deployment of the kind of
language that he believed was epitomized in talk of human
rights:
15. The phrase "rights as trumps" is, of course, that of Ronald Dworkin. RONALD
DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). For a very good introduction to the ideas
of this hugely influential figure, see RONALD DwORKIN, LIFE'S DOmINION: AN ARGUMENT
ABOUT ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA (1993).
16. See generally GIORGIO FILIBECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH
(1994) (providing a collection of pontifical writings that address human rights).
17. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (Fr. 1789).
18. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchial Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 46 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) [hereinafter
NONSENSE UPON STILTS].
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The more abstract-that is, the more extensive the proposition is, the
more liable is it to involve a fallacy....
Hasty generalization, the great stumbling-block of intellectual van-
ity!- hasty generalization, the rock that even genius itself is so apt
to split upon!-hasty generalization, the bane of prudence and sci-
ence!
19
Bentham's criticism of the Declaration flowed from this skepti-
cal starting position. Article I of the Declaration, which states
that "Men (all men) are born and remain free," ° drew from him
the following withering response: "No, not a single man: not a
single man that ever was, or is, or will be. All men, on the con-
trary, are born in subjection, and the most absolute subjection-
the subjection of a helpless child to the parents on whom he de-
pends every moment for his existence."2
Article II's assertion of the "natural and imprescriptible rights
of... liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression"22
inspired Bentham to make one of the most famous assaults on
human rights ever mounted in the history of human thought:
In proportion to the want of happiness resulting from the want of
rights, a reason exists for wishing that there were such things as
rights. But reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are
not rights;-a reason for wishing that a certain right were estab-
lished, is not that right-want is not supply-hunger is not bread.
That which has no existence cannot be destroyed-that which cannot
be destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction.
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts.
23
Bentham thought the whole idea of a written document like the
Declaration was misplaced:
What should it have done, then? To this question an answer is
scarcely within the province of this paper: the proposition with which
I set out is, not that the Declaration of Rights should have been
worded differently, but that nothing underany such name, or with
any such design, should have been attempted.
19. Id. at 47-48.
20. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. I (Fr. 1789).
21. Bentham, supra note 18, at 49.
22. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. TI (Fr. 1789).
23. Bentham, supra note 18, at 53.
24. Id. at 62.
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The alternative and better approach from Bentham's perspec-
tive was to enact laws which were focused, targeted at particular
ends, and which would have a far more effective (because realiz-
able) enforcement mechanism than could ever accompany decla-
rations of human rights.
As though Bentham's strictures had not been enough, French
style human rights also received severe intellectual punishment
from that other towering figure in nineteenth-century political
philosophy, Karl Marx. In Marx's essay On the Jewish Question,26
Marx excoriated the individualism and the selfishness of human
rights. The right to liberty was the "freedom... of a man treated
as an isolated monad and withdrawn into himself."2' The right of
a man to property was "the right to enjoy his possessions and dis-
pose of the same arbitrarily, without regard for other men, inde-
pendently from society, the right of selfishness."2' The right to
equality merely guaranteed that "each man shall without dis-
crimination be treated as a self-sufficient monad."29 None of these
"so-called rights of man [went] beyond egoistic man, man as he is
in civil society, namely an individual withdrawn behind his pri-
vate interests and whims and separated from the community." 0
Marx did not, however, dismiss out of hand the possibility that
some kind of rights approach might be helpful. In particular, he
developed the distinction that the Declaration had made between
the rights of man and the rights of the citizen.3 The distinction is
well stated by Jeremy Waldron:
The former, "as different from the rights of the citizen," are to Marx
nothing but the rights of egoistic man. But citizens' rights, as such,
cannot be so easily dismissed. The right to participate in shaping the
general will (Article III), the free communication of thoughts and
opinions (Article XI), the right to demand an account from public of-
ficials (Article XV), and democratic rights in general: none of these
can be made sense of as the rights of "an isolated monad withdrawn
into himself' or even as the right to do something "without regard for
25. See id. at 69.
26. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS, supra note 18, at
137.
27. Id. at 146.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 147.
3L See id. at 145.
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other men." On the contrary such rights are explicitly constitutive of
certain forms of action in common with others, and Marx recognizes
that. In political community, he writes, man "counts as a species be-
ing" and "is valued as a communal being," as "a moral person." Po-
litical rights, he goes on, are "rights that are only exercised in com-
munity with other men." The suggestion seems to be that, in their
form at least, these rights help to constitute the sort of communit I
that Marx expects to see in the final phase of human emancipation.'
III. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RIGHTS TALK
The combined effect of Bentham and Marx was to undermine
the language of human and natural rights in a way that must
have seemed for generations as entirely fatal. Instead, in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the emphasis was on
securing the kind of civil liberties to which Marx was at least
partly sympathetic, pre-eminently the right to vote, to engage in
political debate, and to associate with others for political pur-
poses. Once these were achieved, Bentham's insight that the cor-
rect way to maximize public benefit was through targeted legisla-
tion came into play, with the legislatures about which Bentham
was so enthusiastic now having the added legitimacy of being
composed on a properly representative basis.
The unexpected renaissance of human rights in the second half
of the twentieth century was made possible by enormous tragedy.
After 1945, it seemed impossibly pedantic to argue that human
rights could have no place in the new world being constructed
from the ashes of the old. Whatever the logic of the argument,
confidence in the virtues of Benthamite positivism could not sur-
vive a realization of the crimes against humanity that were com-
mitted by elected leaders unrestrained by law. Moreover, in the
immediate post-war period, Marx's legacy appeared to be appro-
priated by an all-powerful ruler in the Soviet Union who seemed
to view citizens' rights, if anything, as even more subversive than
the human rights that Marx so despised. So western Europe
turned back to human rights, as a means of defending itself from
both the democratic centralism to its east and the fascism that
would lurk forever in its past. The West German and Italian Con-
32. Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to Marx, supra note 26, at 119, 129-30 (internal
cross-references omitted).
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stitutions were reconstructed with strong rights components."3
The European Convention on Human Rights was agreed, 4 as was
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 5 and the Genocide
Convention. 6
The criticisms made so effectively by Bentham and Marx were
implicitly met in the new culture of human rights that began af-
ter 1945 and which has gathered so much pace recently. These
various international instruments and constitutional documents
are both more wide-ranging and paradoxically less ambitious in
their remit than the French Declaration two centuries prior.
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dealt with lib-
erty, 7 equality," property,39 and speech 0 in a way that Marx
would have recognized and excoriated, but it also included citi-
zens' social and economic rights about which Marx would have
been enthusiastic. These rights include the right to take part in
government,4 ' the right to social security,42 the right to work,43
the right to a decent standard of living,' and the right to educa-
tion.45 This trend towards inclusivity was continued in the United
Nations Covenants that eventually followed the Universal Decla-
ration in 1966.46 The fact that there were two such documents,
one on civil and political rights47 and another on economic, social,
33. GRUNDGESETZ [GGI [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.); COSTrruzIoNE [COST] [Constitu-
tion] art. 2 (Italy). For a discussion of the human rights components in the German and
Italian Constitutions, see Eileen Voss, Germany, in EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra
note 9, at 143, and Danilo A. Leonardi, Italy, in EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 9,
at 307.
34. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, su-
pra note 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 221.
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(]I), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
36. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
37. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(IHI), supra note 35, art.
3.
38. Id. art. 7.
39. Id. art. 17.
40. Id. art. 19.
4L Id. art. 21.
42. Id. art. 22.
43. Id. art. 23.
44. Id. art. 25.
45. Id. art. 26.
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and cultural rights,4" indicates the breadth of the new interna-
tional language of human rights. This fact is further reflected in
many of the other instruments agreed to under this rubric in re-
cent decades.49
However, in an important sense, these documents were not the
powerful instruments that their language might lead the observer
to assume. The Universal Declaration was just that, a declara-
tion, rather than a piece of legislation in the traditional or inter-
national legal sense. Its pronouncement changed nothing in any
tangible way. It was a reaffirmation of human dignity intended to
inform rather than predetermine political debate.50 Had some
post war Benthamite disciple attacked the Universal Declara-
tion's "anarchical fallacies," the document's drafters would have
been entitled to respond that the criticism missed the point en-
tirely. The same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, of the other hu-
man rights instruments that have been promulgated. Though
these instruments do contain enforcement mechanisms, they are
not of powerful design or intended for instant deployment. Com-
mittees of experts meet and report to other committees which re-
view national records and perhaps cross-examine local officials. 5'
When the international community has embraced the language of
human rights, it has been careful to ensure that in the process it
has not thereby agreed to bring forth such rights. Thus, the rod
that has been made for its back is rhetorical rather than legal.
The issue of enforcement is avoided less easily in the national
sphere. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
was aimed, after all, only at France. Moreover, it was the un-
48. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
49. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992); Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736
(1989).
50. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(II), supra note 35,
pmbl. (stating that "the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their
faith in fundamental human rights .... ").
51. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 48, arts. 16-22, 993 U.N.T.S. at 9-10; International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 49, arts. 8-14, 660 U.N.T.S. at 224-30; cf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 46, arts. 28-45, 999
U.N.T.S. at 179-84.
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doubted capacity of the French authorities to act in realizing the
statements in the document that added zest and punch to Ben-
tham's critique. Human rights, in their domestic incarnation as
constitutional or civil rights, are quintessentially part of a na-
tion's legal system. As such, they are invariably able to avail the
authority of law to ensure that their version of reality will pre-
vail. Indeed, as constitutional or civil rights, most legal systems
give human rights priority over other merely legislative or posi-
tive rights.52 Thus, if a country embraces a right to liberty or
equality, for example, the Benthamite critique comes into play
through the confident knowledge that this piece of "nonsense
upon stilts" means something tangible, as opposed to the soft
pseudo-dictates of international human rights that float some-
where in the global, legal stratosphere.
The answer, at the national level no less than at the interna-
tional level, implicitly constructed to meet the Benthamite attack
has depended on words that mean something different than they
appear to mean. The United States has been a pioneer in this
covert campaign of verbal distortion. The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution declares that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"53 but it
is common knowledge that state and national authorities in the
United States are perfectly entitled to make such laws and, in-
deed, have done so on many occasions. Not even in the United
States is a person permitted to arrange the murder of his or her
neighbor without fear of retribution, or casually shout fire in a
crowded cinema just to test his or her theories on the effect of
mass panic in enclosed spaces. Indeed, so obvious do we think all
this to be that we do not even notice it. The linguistic distortion is
so embedded that it has become a part of the meaning of words
that seemingly say the opposite.54
More recent constitutional instruments are more explicit about
the concessions that the language of human rights must make to
political reality. The Canadian Charter of Rights55 and the New
52. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.); Constitution of Ireland,
1937.
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
54. Cf. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.) (containing basic rights); Voss,
supra note 33, at 152-53.
55. CAN. CoNST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms).
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Zealand Bill of Rights56 both make the rights that they guarantee
subject to override where particular necessity demands." The
European Convention is perfectly frank about the degree to which
it suggests rather than guarantees human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms. Thus, Article 10 of the Convention declares that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression."" However,
the right is qualified by reference
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the in-
terests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.5 9
Article 11 likewise restricts its guarantee of freedom of associa-
tion and peaceful assembly by reference to what is "necessary in a
democratic society"6 for an almost equally wide category of rea-
sons, including national security, public safety, the protection of
health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.6' The Convention's right to property is even more circum-
scribed, permitting the deprivation of possessions "in the public
interest"62 and specifically empowering the State "to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accor-
dance with the general interest .... .""
These are not exactly the kind of "human rights" that the
French revolutionaries had in mind or that Bentham so effec-
tively castigated. Instead, the effect of entrenching rights in law
56. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990.
57. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms), § 1 (permitting interferences with rights only insofar as these can
be said to be within "such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, pt. I, § 5 (stating that the
rights set forth may be qualified only by reference to "such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" or by the overriding
supremacy of the legislature).
58. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, su-
pra note 5, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 11.
61. Id.
62. First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 1.
63. Id.
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in such a qualified fashion is to give to the judiciary the power to
determine when the rights should apply, and when they should
be trumped by exceptions that permit them to be lawfully sub-
verted. This is true even of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, albeit to a lesser extent than it is in the
European Convention and the Canadian and New Zealand consti-
tutional initiatives. We are left with the paradox that the only
way that it has been possible to rescue rights-analysis from in-
tellectual absurdity is to contradict the very universality and im-
prescriptibility that is said to be its essence. This is done not
baldly, for that would be to give the game away entirely. Rather,
this is done implicitly, by constructing constitutional instruments
which bear the outward signs of "rights documents," but which
are in reality invitations to the judicial branch to resolve conflicts
that inevitably arise when the rhetoric of rights collides with po-
litical and social reality. This is the reason the constitutionaliza-
tion of rights always entails an increase in judicial power.
Whether it also entails an improvement in the protection of civil
liberties is the question to which we will soon turn, but not before
we briefly consider the vulnerability of civil liberties in a political
culture that has not traditionally had access to any overriding
constitutional, civil, or human rights of any type. The United
Kingdom is the best example because it was not subject to the
cataclysmic tyranny that provoked the resurgence of rights-talk
in other jurisdictions, nor has it been the subject of any dramatic
internal revolution that opened the door to the creation of consti-
tutional rights.
IV. TiE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
We have seen how Marx was more prepared to accept the util-
ity of citizens' rights than he was the notion of human rights.64 It
is an acceptance of this notion of citizens' rights that lies behind
the long acceptance of, and support for, the concept of civil liber-
ties in Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is clear that civil liber-
ties are not the same as human rights.65 Rather, civil liberties are
64. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
65. What follows is a brief summary of an argument developed at some length in M.D.
EWING & C.A. GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES: POLTIcAL FREEDOM AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN, 1914-45, at 1-35 (2000) [hereinafter EWING & GEARTY, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES].
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the freedoms essential to produce and maintain an effective sys-
tem of representative democracy in any given state or country.66
Pre-eminent among such civil liberties is the right to vote, an en-
titlement without which no country can properly describe itself as
democratic.67 Such a right can only be obtained by direct legisla-
tive action, which is positive in character, but the secondary civil
liberties of expression, assembly, and association may be secured
in any given society through a mixture of both legislative inter-
vention and the guarantee of a more negative protection, and
through the availability of common law remedies in the event of
their abuse.68 The purpose of these civil liberties is to guarantee
that there is in place a properly functioning representative as-
sembly for the purpose of making laws.69 It is obvious that in such
a scheme there is no room whatsoever for human rights as such.
Instead, what "rights" exist are the consequence of legislation
passed by the democratic assembly that specifically grants en-
forceable rights to particular classes of persons."° These rights
may be qualified, removed, restored, truncated, or expanded.
They are not "human" at all. Rather, they are the contingent out-
comes of a political process that is always in flux."'
The United Kingdom has for generations been the paradig-
matic model for this sort of representative democracy. The Con-
stitution of the country has long been declared to be rooted in
civil liberties, parliamentary sovereignty, and the rule of law. 2
Even the Human Rights Act does not remove this ancient com-
mitment to parliamentary supremacy. 3 The protection of civil
liberties within this framework depends, however, on the support
of both the legislative and judicial branches. For generations this
support has been widely assumed, at least by judges and lawyers,
to be solidly in place. The classic role of the courts in this ideal
model may be illustrated by just two cases, one very old and
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id. at 18, 34.
68. Id. at 18-21
69. See id. at 20-21 (discussing the role of Parliament in the development of political
participation in England).
70. Id. at 34.
71. Id. at 22.
72. See A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 469-73 (10th ed. 1959).
73. However, recent developments in European Union law mark a change where the
law within the remit of the Union is concerned. See R. v. Sec'y of State for Transport ex
parte Factortame, Ltd., [1990] 2 A.C. 85 (H.L. 1989) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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justly celebrated, the other of much more recent origin. The first
is Beatty v. Gillbanks74 in which the freedom to assemble was pro-
tected in a classic English fashion.75 The case arose out of the
Salvation Army's insistence in processing through the streets of a
provincial town.76 Their hostility to the consumption of alcohol
made them a controversial presence that drew the attention of a
fairly disputatious and potentially hostile mob that called itself
the Skeleton Army." On several previous occasions, the two "ar-
mies" had clashed when finally two local magistrates took it upon
themselves to ban all assemblies in the town. 8 When the Salva-
tion Army next set out on a procession, their leader, William
Beatty, was warned to desist or face arrest. 9 Determined to pro-
ceed, Beatty and two of his colleagues were then arrested and
bound over to keep the peace, it having been found that they were
guilty of the offence of unlawful assembly. 0 The case came before
the Queen's Bench by way of a challenge to the binding-over or-
der."' The context in which the case came before the court is im-
portant because no basic freedom or constitutional right was ex-
plicitly engaged. Instead, the case looks for all the world like a
run of the mill application of tried and trusted criminal law prin-
ciples.82
This is not, however, how the judges hearing the appeal treated
the case. Pointing out that there was "nothing in their conduct
when they were assembled together which was either tumultuous
or against the peace,"8 Judge Field thought it of vital importance
that the violence that was anticipated would have been "caused
by other people antagonistic to the appellants."' The judge went
on to state that:
[w]hat has happened here is that an unlawful organization has as-
sumed to itself the right to prevent the appellants and others from
74. [18821 9 Q.B.D. 308.
75. See id. at 314-15.
76. Id. at 308-09.
77. Id. at 309.
78. Id. at 309-10.
79. Id. at 310-11.
80. Id. at 311.
81 Id. at 312.
82. See id. at 313 (stating that "[blefore they can be convicted it must be shewn that
this offense has been committed.").
83. Id.
84. Id. at 314.
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lawfully assembling together, and the finding of the justices amounts
to this, that a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act if he
knows that his doing it may cause another to do an unlawful act.
There is no authority for such a proposition ....
Accordingly, judgment was given for the Salvationists. 6 The
case is the classic statement of the right to freedom of assembly
in Britain, and epitomizes the residual approach to the secondary
civil liberties that has been such a traditional characteristic of
English law. The Salvationists were free to march, not because of
any positive assertion of such a right on their behalf, but because
no law prevented such conduct. The judges were vigilant to pro-
tect the freedom from unjustified encroachment.87 The law may
not be as clear as the First Amendment, but, as interpreted in
this way by the judges, the effect was the same.
Our second example is far more recent. In D.P.P. v. Jones,"8 at
issue was not the common law simpliciter but rather the role of
the judges in interpreting statutes in a way that was sympathetic
to civil libertarian principles.8 9 The appellants were convicted of
trespassory assembly, arising out of their presence within a four
mile radius of Stonehenge. Their actions were contrary to a po-
lice order banning such assemblies for a period of three days
around the summer solstice.9 Critically, none of the appellants
was involved in any violence, nor had any of them made any
threat of violence.92 Moreover, the gathering did not create any
obstruction on the highway. On these facts and overturning the
High Court, the House of Lords by the narrowest of majorities94
held that the offence was not proven-an outcome that was




86. Id. at 15. The other judge on the court, Judge Cave, concurred in judgment with-
out adding any comments of his own. Id.
87. See id. at 314 (stating that there was no evidence that the appellant "had any in-
tention to commit any riotous act").
88. [19991 2 A.C. 240 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
89. See id. at 242.
90. Id. at 252. Stonehenge is a famous, ancient monument where many have sought to
congregate at times of pagan importance.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 251.
93. Id. at 251-52.
94. The House of Lords voted three to two to allow the appeal. Id. at 259, 265, 278,
281, 294.
95. The key majority opinion was that of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg.
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In both Beatty and Jones, the courts were performing a func-
tion that the idealized version of Britain's unwritten constitution
requires of them. Since there are no "human rights" guaranteed
in any document, it is clear that the health of Britain's represen-
tative democracy depends both on the forbearance of Parliament
in not legislating to erode civil liberties and on the vigilance of
the judges in deploying their powers of adjudication and interpre-
tation to protect civil liberties from legislative and executive at-
tack. As far as legislation is concerned, however, the record is not
at all good. In Jones, for example, what was at issue was a stat-
96ute, recently passed and, insofar as this particular provision
was concerned, designed to suffocate popular demonstrations on a
matter of great importance to many, regardless of whether the
assemblies under attack were in any way a threat to the peace or
in other senses a nuisance." Depressing though its content is,
this statutory provision must stand for the purpose of this article
as emblematic of the approach that the legislative branch in Brit-
ain has taken to civil liberties during the entire democratic era. It
is true, of course, that the primary civil liberty, the right to vote,
has been secured by successive Acts of Parliament.98 But the sec-
ondary civil liberties necessary to make representative democracy
work have been under perpetual attack. The draconian repression
that prevailed during the war-time emergencies that punctuated
the twentieth century may be explained, to some extent, in a his-
torical context. But the legislative controls on free speech, free-
dom of assembly, and personal liberty that have flowed unend-
ingly from successive parliaments in the decades since universal
suffrage was achieved yield no straightforward explanation, other
See id. at 251-59. Apart from being a senior judicial figure Lord Irving of Lairg, is also
both Speaker in the House of Lords and a key figure in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister,
Tony Blair. That the crucial speech in favor of civil liberties came from a member of the
government in a case involving both the police and the prosecuting authorities is a nice
challenge to those who assume without argument that separation of powers is a necessary
feature of all properly functioning representative democracies.
96. Id. at 252. The defendants were charged with "trespassory assembly" under sec-
tion 14A of the Public Order Act 1986. Id.
97. See id.
98. The process was started by the Great Reform Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4 (Eng.) and
the Representation of the People Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. (Eng.), both of which were
passed amid great controversy. The Great Reform Act, in particular, was not enthusiasti-
cally promulgated by a reform-minded legislative branch, but was rather to a large extent
embraced as a means of preventing even more radical reform being foisted upon the Con-
stitution by outside forces. See JOHN STEVENSON, POPULAR DISTURBANCES IN ENGLAND,
1700-1832, at 295-96 (2d ed. 1992).
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than the temptingly obvious one that the legislative branch has
never cared, or has cared only in a partisan or rhetorical sense,
about the civil liberties that the idealized version of the unwritten
British constitution would require it to defend.99
Nor, Beatty and Jones notwithstanding, have the courts be-
haved much better. Indeed, these two cases represent a high pro-
portion of the decisions delivered throughout the last century that
succeed in being both positive and principled from a civil liber-
tarian point of view. Time and again, the judges have shown their
true colors by upholding war-time emergency powers,00 extend-
ing police powers of arrest,'0 ' extending powers of search and sei-
zure,10 2 and legitimizing executive attacks on freedom of political
association.0 3 Crises such as the industrial disputes that racked
the 1980s 1°4 and the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland' °5 have
shown the English senior judiciary at least to be invariably on the
side of the executive. Though celebrated for generations as the
epitome of all that is good about the British Constitution, it might
be better to view Beatty as the exception that proves the far more
dismal rule. The protection of civil liberties in Britain's non-rights
based, unwritten constitution has been based on two false prem-
ises. The first is that Parliament would be careful about restrict-
ing civil liberties, and the second is that the judiciary would be
vigilant in their support.' 6 Neither being the case, those seeking
to assert their civil liberties in controversial circumstances have
had next to nothing with which to defend themselves from execu-
tive aggression.
99. The empirical basis for these generalizations is set out at length in K.D. EWING &
C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN BRITrrAIN (1990)
[hereinafter EWING & GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER] and EWING & GEARTY, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 65.
100. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L. 1941) (appeal taken from Eng.).
101. Duncan v. Jones, [1936] 1 KB. 218 (1935).
102. Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 KB. 164.
103. McEldowney v. Forde, [1971] A.C. 632 (H.L. 1969) (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
104. See generally EWING & GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER, supra note 99, ch. 4.
105. See generally C.A. Gearty, The Cost of Human Rights: English Judges and the
Northern Irish Troubles, 47 CLP 19 (1994).
106. EWING & GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER, supra note 99, at 9-13 (countering
A.V. Dicey's assumptions in this regard).
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V. THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES BY MEANS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE LESSONS FROM THE UNITED
STATES
It is dissatisfaction with the way in which the United King-
dom's unwritten constitution has functioned in recent years that
has driven the recent campaign for a British Bill of Rights. This
movement has now achieved fabulous success with the enactment
and implementation of the Human Rights Act. As noted earlier,
this document does not destroy parliamentary sovereignty en-
tirely, but it does subvert it by introducing a new layer of rights
and freedoms to which the executive and judicial branches are
subject and in which all words in all statutes must henceforth be
read.' O The assumption is that to enact a measure purporting to
guarantee "human rights" is necessarily to enhance their protec-
tion. But how justified is this belief? In particular, since this in-
evitably involves a judicialization of rights-disputes, why should
we now expect the judicial branch suddenly to change its spots
and become the protector of civil liberties? This is, after all, a role
that it has carefully avoided discharging properly for the entire
democratic era.
The United States model is a highly appropriate one to exam-
ine at this juncture. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right to free speech in as unqualified
a fashion as any document since the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen. As we earlier saw, however, in an inevi-
table effort to preserve itself from absurdity, the terms of the
First Amendment have been treated as less absolute than they
appear. This task of tactical dilution has been entrusted to the
judiciary, and in particular to the United States Supreme Court.
From the lawyer's perspective, the results are surprisingly simi-
lar to those that we have already described in the supposedly
constitutionally primitive United Kingdom.
Let us leave to one side for the purposes of this analysis the
huge number of First Amendment cases that have flowed from
the Supreme Court that have been related to free speech as other
than a civil liberty, those that deal with commercial speech,0 8 ar-
107. See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 6 (U.K.).
108. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
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tistic expression,"°pornography," ° and the like. The First Amend-
ment merely declares itself to be there; it does not explain its
purpose. Thus inevitably, like any hugely abstract statute, it has
found many unlikely litigants attaching their interests to its coat-
tails. It is only by an accident of language that these decisions can
be characterized as constitutional cases, since few if any issues of
civil libertarian principle are actually raised in them. This con-
trasts starkly with those cases on free speech as a political liberty
that raise recognizable questions related to representative de-
mocracy and the importance of the protection of civil liberties to a
healthy political culture.
The First Amendment record of the Supreme Court contains
significant decisions unequivocally in favor of free speech. Cer-
tainly, there are more such cases in the United States, than there
are in the United Kingdom. The libel decision of New York Times
v. Sullivan,"' the Vietnam free speech cases," 2 the Pentagon Pa-
pers case," 3 the famous flag burning decision from the late
1980s,"' and many other similar rulings offer an impression of a
vibrant bench committed to the value of diverse political speech
in an open-textured democracy. Viewed historically, however, the
record looks rather different. The assaults on left-leaning views
mounted by the executive and legislative branches of the United
States government in the aftermath of World War I and World
War II found enthusiastic allies on the judicial bench. The ven-
omous anti-socialism of 1918-1930, which saw political agitators
jailed for long terms and their organizations destroyed, was le-
gitimized by a series of Supreme Court rulings." 5 To the extent
these cases are remembered at all today, it is through the opin-
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
109. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
110. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
111. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
112. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
113. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
114. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
115. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 368-69 (1927) (rejecting petitioner's
claim that conviction under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act for involvement with
the Communist labor party violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668, 670 (1925) (finding constitutional a statute that prohib-
ited advocating the overthrow of the government); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
216 (1919) (holding that speech attempting to obstruct the recruiting service of the United
States in violation of the Espionage Act was not protected by the First Amendment).
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ions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, who are seen as blazing a
trail for the more liberal approach to speech that prevails to-
day."6 Less often noticed is the fact that even these justices were
not unequivocal in their support of principle at this difficult
time.1
17
The era of McCarthyism produced a Supreme Court decision of
extraordinary deference to executive and legislative power,
Dennis v. United States."8 The plurality and concurring opinions
in Dennis provide a depressing answer to the question that every
contemporary constitutional rights enthusiast should be asking
all the time: Why did the First Amendment not protect United
States citizens from McCarthyism?" 9 Surely support for the civil
liberties of unpopular political groups is said to be a very large
part of the rationale for the free speech guarantee? In reality, of
course, politics cannot be avoided by deploying the tricks of the
constitutional lawyers' trade. Grand rights claims in venerable
documents merely divert the course of political energy into the
courtroom, where the forces of the State reconstitute themselves
dressed in the garb of constitutional necessity. The judges read
the political runes as best they can, often without realizing that
this is what they are doing, and express what their instincts tell
them in the only language available to them, constitutional law.
Seen from this perspective, more recent advances in free
speech principles in the United States can be viewed in a differ-
ent way. The imposition of First Amendment guarantees in a case
like Sullivan was made much easier for the Supreme Court by
the fact that it was dealing with a preposterous manipulation of
the law by state officials, 2 ° on an issue, racial segregation, in
116. See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (" If... the beliefs ex-
pressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of
the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance
and have their way.").
117. The record, familiar of course to many United States law students, is briefly dis-
cussed in Conor Gearty, Citizenship and Freedom of Expression, in RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP
271, 275 (Robert Blackburn ed., 1993). Readers of this journal will be especially informed
on this topic, on account of the many relevant (and excellent) contributions to the debate
surrounding Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts in 34 U. RICH.
L. REV. 359,359-566 (2000).
118. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
119. For example, Justice Jackson in his concurrence stated that "even an individual
cannot claim that the Constitution protects him in advocating or teaching overthrow of
government by force or violence." Id. at 570. (Jackson, J., concurring).
120. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULuVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
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which northern and elite opinion took a decidedly different view
than that of southern political leaders.'2' There was not one na-
tion speaking with one voice in a way hostile to a minority group.
Rather, there was a divided society, with the federal and state
authorities taking very different lines on a key issue of princi-
ple.'22 Against this background, the Supreme Court's assertion of
First Amendment guarantees was hardly a brave or courageous
act. Rather the reverse: not to have decided as it did would have
been to expose the Court to far more criticism from far more in-
fluential quarters than it received for the decision it actually
made. In the same way, the decisions of the Court in the late
1960s and early 1970s arising out of the Vietnam conflict, and in
particular the Court's holding in the Pentagon Papers case, 2 3 can
be seen against a backdrop of great anxiety about the rationale,
morality and future direction of the war. Once again, the Court
was not siding with a despised minority against the anger of a
united country; rather it was deploying the weapon of constitu-
tional principle on one side of a public debate that had already
manifestly divided the nation.
VI. CONCLUSION: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act represents the par-
tial, but only partial, Americanization of the British constitution.
As noted, it incorporates the European Convention on Human
Rights into the law of the United Kingdom, but does so in a delib-
erately half-baked kind of way. A central feature of the measure
from the perspective of this article is that it explicitly preserves
parliamentary sovereignty, stating that judges do not have the
power to strike down legislative measures for incompatibility
with Convention rights.'24 To this extent, the old British system is
preserved. However, the Act also insists that "[s]o far as it is pos-
AMENDMENT 35-36 (1992).
121. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1947,
at 389-99 (1996).
122. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 120, at 41-42 (describing the changing political climate in
the country at large during the early 1960s).
123. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
124. Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 3(2)(b) (U.K.). But see id. §§ 4, 19 (regarding the
declarations of incompatibility which can be issued under the Act and the requirement to
regard human rights when introducing government measures in Parliament).
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sible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights."'25 This is a large and intrusive new power
of statutory interpretation. It purports to apply to all legislation,
passed or to be passed. 26 All previously settled versions of what
statutes mean, together with all fresh approaches to previously
unlitigated or recently enacted provisions, must now take into ac-
count this new mandate of human rights consistency. As if this
were not enough, another provision imposes a new statutory duty
on all public authorities not "to act in a way which is incompati-
ble with a Convention right."2 ' Only official conduct which is ab-
solutely required by primary legislation may flout the Convention
rights with impunity.
28
Preserved though it technically is, there is not a great deal left
of the parliamentary sovereignty that has sustained the British
Constitution for generations. Like the United States Bill of
Rights, but to an even more dramatic degree, the Human Rights
Act can be expected to unleash a torrent of litigation in all sorts of
directions while its implications for every realm of law are slowly
worked out through the adversarial process. 29 From the perspec-
tive of civil liberties, we should note that the Act includes Article
3 of the First Protocol of the Convention 3 ° under which national
authorities "undertake to hold free elections at reasonable inter-
vals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legisla-
ture."'' In terms of the secondary civil liberties we should also
here recall Article 10's declaration that "[e]veryone has the right
to freedom of expression, " 11 2 as well as Article l1's guarantee of
125. Id. § 3(1).
126. Id. § 3(2)(a).
127. Id. § 6(1). The term "public authority" is not, however, defined in the Act. See id.
§§ 6(1), (3), (5).
128. Id. § 6(2). Courts, however, may issue non-enforceable declarations of incompati-
bility. Id. § 4.
129. The subject is, of course, a vast one, with legal bookshops that had hitherto ig-
nored human rights now groaning under the weight of rival texts of greater or lesser
value. For a valuable introduction on the subject that places it in its historical and politi-
cal context, see KLUG, supra note 6. For an excellent discussion of the legal essentials, see
J. WADHAMi AND H. MOUNTFIELD, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUIMIAN RIGHTS (1999).
130. Human Rights Act 1998, schedule 1, pt. 2, art. 3 (U.K.).
13L Id.
132. Id. pt. 1, art. 10, § 1.
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"the right to freedom of peaceful assembly."1 3 One should re-
member, however, the broad exception to each of these rights,
which places in the judicial branch the responsibility of deter-
mining when infringement of either or both is excusable because
the infringement is "necessary in a democratic society."
1 34
How will the Human Rights Act change the way in which civil
liberties are protected in the United Kingdom? In interpreting the
Act, British judges are required to acknowledge the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Com-
mission of Human Rights.'35 These two bodies were established
under the European Convention to provide authoritative rulings
at the international level where a state was alleged to have vio-
lated any of the Convention rights.'36 The main work of these two
institutions, the latter now superseded by a newly invigorated
court, 137 is to adjudicate disputes brought against member states
by individuals within their jurisdiction that claim to be victims of
a violation of their Convention rights. A huge body of case law
has inevitably arisen, not the least of which is in the civil liberties
arena. 3 ' Thus, there is a corpus of law to which the judges in
Britain will be able to refer when working out the effects of
planting qualified "human rights" on a system in which civil lib-
erties and a remedy-based approach to the protection of basic
freedoms is already so well-entrenched, albeit defectively when
viewed from the long historical perspective.
The guidance from the European human rights institutions on
the protection of civil liberties is not entirely unlike that from the
United States Supreme Court regarding the First Amendment,
though there are significant differences at the edges. The main
body of cases has focused on expression and assembly.139 Within
the parameters set by an overriding commitment to liberal de-
133. Id. pt. 1, art. 11, § 1.
134. Id. pt. 1, art. 10, § 2; pt. 1, art. 11, § 2.
135. Id. § 2(1)(a)-(d).
136. Adam Tompkins, Civil Liberties in the Council of Europe, in EUROPEAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES, supra note 9, at 1, 17.
137. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 1, 1998, Europ. T.S. No. 55.
138. See generally P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1998).
139. For example, the Strasbourg Court has been disinclined to develop an expansive
approach to the free elections guarantee in the First Protocol. Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt
v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 16 (1987).
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mocracy, the Court has been strongly supportive of political
speech, recognizing its importance to democratic freedom. It has
also been particularly skeptical about the contention that political
speech needs to be truncated due to the necessities of democratic
society. 140 In an important series of decisions arising out of the
British government's attempts to ban the book Spycatcher'14 in
the 1980s, the Court affirmed these principles in a relatively con-
troversial context. The Court, however, declined to go so far as to
say that the Convention requires a ban on any kind of "prior re-
straint" of publication such as has been hewn out of the First
Amendment.'
In contrast to these cases, and in line with United States
courts, the Court and Commission on Human Rights have been
reluctant to be activist with respect to the civil liberties of highly
controversial political activists against whom there has been a
high degree of societal hostility and whose political engagement
threatened the entire liberal democratic system. 43 Thus, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany's Berufsverbote legislation, under which
persons could be denied State jobs on account of their political
views, 1" was upheld in the face of a Convention attack until the
end of the Cold War made it largely irrelevant.'45 In the same
country, attempts by the local Communist Party to challenge its
prohibition on the basis of Article 11 proved equally unavailing.
146
140. The leading case is Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407
(1986), where the principles the Court has subsequently regularly applied were set out for
the first time. Id. at 421.
141. PETER WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER: THE CANDID AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SECRET
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (1987).
142. The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 13166/87, 14 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 229, 233 (1991); The Observer and The Guardian v. United Kingdom, App. No.
13585/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 153, 181-82 (1991).
143. To some extent this is at the present time merely a historical point, though there
is no guarantee that it will remain so.
144. Glasenapp v. Germany, App. No. 9228/80, 9 Ear. H.R. Rep. 25 (1986).
145. Compare Vogt v. Germany, App. No. 17851/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 205, 239 (1996)
(concluding that membership in the DKP-Germany's Communist party-was "not suffi-
cient to establish convincingly that it was necessary in a democratic society to dismiss
her"), with Glasenapp, 9 Ear. H.R. Rep. at 46 (concluding that consideration of
Glasenapp's "opinions and attitude merely.., to satisfy itself as to whether she possessed
one of the necessary personal qualifications... did not interfere with her rights to free-
dom of expression"), and Kosiek v. Germany, App. No. 9404182, 9 Ear. H.R. Rep. 328, 342
(1986) (concluding that consideration of Kosiek's "opinions and attitudes" to determine
whether he was qualified to perform the job and whether he had behaved during the pro-
bationary period did not infringe upon his right to freedom of expression).
146. App. No. 250/57 [1955-1956-1957] 1 Y.B. Ear. Cony. on H.R. 222 (Ear. Comm'n on
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More surprisingly, in Britain both the decision to disband trade
unions at the Government's communications headquarters
("GCHQ") and the decision to prohibit members of the Northern
Ireland based political party Sinn F6in from direct communica-
tion on radio and television were found not to raise serious Con-
vention issues when challenges were mounted in the European
Commission of Human Rights. 47
The Human Rights Act incorporates the European Convention
on Human Rights which is, despite its name, an ideological
document. 4 8 It guarantees only certain rights and then only in a
very particular way. The rights are mainly civil and political in
substance, but they may be circumscribed in a way that permits
State action if the structure of government is threatened by their
exercise. 149 In this sense, perhaps the most important Convention
article is also one of the least noted: "Nothing in this Convention
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in
the Convention."5 ° The political discourse is free, but only within
certain limits. To this extent the Convention mirrors the tradi-
tional British constitution in that it is strong on civil and political
liberty, but unrelenting in its antagonism to political expression
that is not the rhetoric of "the right kind of freedom."' 5 ' It could
be argued that the United States's differences on this matter are
merely ones of degree, with the practical control on speech exer-
cised by the market and the relative security of the country from
internal and external threats allowing a closer fit between the
theory and practice of political liberalism than might otherwise
have been permitted.
The judicial branch cannot be expected to perform, and rarely if
H.R.).
147. Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11603/85, 10 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 269 (1987). For the media ban case, see R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. [1991]
1 A.C. 696 (H.L.).
148. See M.D. Ewing, The Politics of the British Constitution, [2000] PUB. L. 405.
149. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
150. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, su-
pra note 5, art. 17, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
151. The phrase was that of a British Home Secretary justifying the use of police pow-
ers against members of the Communist Party of Great Britain in the 1920s. See EWING &
GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CwVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 65, at 147-48.
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ever performs, the role of defender of the politically subversive
from the malignant exercise of hostile State power. Great political
change can be achieved through the streets and sometimes also, if
the conditions are right, through the ballot box, but it can rarely
if ever be brought about by court order. That is not to say that
litigation does not achieve some minimal successes for political
campaigners and occasional successes for those seeking to exer-
cise their civil liberties. It can also help create the conditions for
radical political action, and thereby contribute to bringing about
that which it cannot do alone. But litigation, even "human rights"
litigation, is no substitute for politics. The Human Rights Act can
be expected to provoke many cases rooted in civil libertarian
principles, and some of these no doubt will be successful, par-
ticularly if the current climate of relative peace and security in
Britain continues.'52 But it does not remove political conflict;
rather it merely transfers part of it from the legislative to the ju-
dicial arena. Only time will tell whether the protection of civil lib-
erties gains from this partial relocation.
152. A challenge to the U.I's official secrets legislation is due imminently, with the
prosecution of a former employee of the security service, David Shayler, likely to raise its
compatibility with the Human Rights Act.
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